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JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction of this appeal was vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to the provisions of UCA §78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j).
IV
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for
a directed verdict claiming that only one half (1/2) of the water rights sold to the
Watrouses by the Kings passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death?
(Record 1131-1138, 1154-1164).
Standard of Review: On appeal from a directed verdict, the appellate court must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if there is a
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained.
Gourdin v. SharonTs Cultural Edu. Recreational Assoc. 845 P.2d 242 (Utah 1992), citing
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).

2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion For Relief Pursuant
To Rule 60(b) URCP?

(Record 1177-1188, 1201-1206).

Standard of Review: A Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed under an abuse of

VI

discretion. Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998), quoting Larsen v. Collina
684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984).
V
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:
Art. Vm, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

STATUTES:
UCA §78-2-2(3)0):
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j):
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

RULES:
Rule 4 URAP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 1(a) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.

vn

Rule 6(a) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 6(e) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 58A(d) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 59 URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.
Rule 60(b) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix.

viii

VI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a directed verdict, in favor of the
Kings, ruling that only one-half of the water rights sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings,
passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond Watrous5 death and an appeal of the
trial court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion asking the trial court to vacate
its grant of a directed verdict in favor of the Kings, ruling that only one-half of the water
rights sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of
Raymond Watrous' death, so that Mr. Henshaw could appeal that part of the trial court's
grant of a directed verdict in favor of the Kings ruling that only one half of the water
rights sold to the Watrouses by the Kings passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of
Raymond Watrous' death.
B
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The Henshaws filed suit against Jack King alleging causes for 1) Breach of
Contract, 2) Tortuous Interference, 3) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and FanDealing, 4) Theft or Conversion, 5) Harassment, and 6) Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress on July 14, 2000. The Henshaws filed an Amended Complaint
asserting the same causes of action on August 22, 2003, and added Bonnie King as a
defendant. Various motions were filed and several orders were entered by the trial court
regarding those motions. This matter went to trial before a jury on April 17, 2006.
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On April 19, 2006, at the close of the plaintiffs' case, the Kings moved for a
directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs
in the case and dismissing several of the Henshaw's claims. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's
claims for intentional interference with economic relations, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, conversion or theft. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that, at
most, Mr. Henshaw could only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the
Watrouses, by the Kings, because the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did
not specify that it was a conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and
there was no evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon
his death.
Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the sole
plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect his three-inch waterline
to the Kings' six-inch waterline, to use the six-inch waterline to water his property, and
that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which water rights were sold
to Barbara Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw.
At conclusion of the trial the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use
the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him by the Warranty
Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to him.1

1. The jury concluded that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water the Kings sold to the
Watrouses and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw because he failed to file a change application with the
-2-

However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold water rights to the Watrouses and
that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty Deeds from
Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to Dee Henshaw and
determined that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted in
themselves.
The Kings prepared an Order On Motions For Directed Verdict, (hereinafter, "the
Order") and sent a copy of "the Order55 to Mr. Henshaw5 s counsel on or about May 4,
2006. Mr. Henshaw5s counsel objected to "the Order55 on May 15, 2006. However, that
objection was not entered on the trial court's docket until May 18, 2006. Nonetheless, the
Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May 15, 2006. The Kings5
counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw5s objection to 'the Order55 on or about May 18, 2006.
(Record 1191-1194). That response was filed with the trial court on May 22, 2006.
The trial court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw5s objection to "the
Order55 on June 19, 2006. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated
that it had signed and entered "the Order55 on May 15, 2006. Neither the Kings nor their
counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a "Notice of Judgment55 on "the Order55 as
required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. See the Judgment Roll and Index for this matter.
Upon learning that the trial court had signed and entered "the Order55 on May 15,
2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming
that the trial court had improperly signed and entered "the Order55 because the time for
Division of Water Rights that is a prerequisite to using any water when the point of use is
changed. However, as Kirk Forbush testified, the failure of the Henshaws tofilethe change
application did not invalidate the sale of the water. (Record 1126-1127).
-3-

him to file an objection to "the Order" had not yet expired. This Motion was filed on
July 27, 2006.
On September 13, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter or
Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not binding
on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could not extend the time
to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order.
On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief Under Rule
60(b), asking the trial court to set aside "the Order", claiming that the Kings deliberately
failed to notify him that the "the Order" had been entered and responded to his Objection
to "the Order" in order to prevent him from learning that "the Order" had been entered in
time to file an appeal from "the Order".
On November 15, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision denying
Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b) holding that Mr. Henshaw was not
sufficiently diligent in determining if "the Order"
had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not
binding on district courts.
Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006.

C
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property,
located in Wayne County, Utah from Mildred Watrous. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755,
789-821).
-4-

2. In conjunction with said purchase of real property, Barbara Henshaw also
purchased water rights to irrigate the referenced property, which rights had previously
been purchased by Mildred and Raymond Watrous from Jack and Bonnie King
(hereinafter the Kings"). (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
3. The water deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the Kings
were selling two hours of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days. (Record 1-16,
467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
4. The language of the Water Deed was incorporated into the Warranty Deed
given Barbara Henshaw by Mildred Watrous at the closing of the purchase of the
property.

(Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).

5. Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the property from his mother Barbara
Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003. However, prior to that
time he had an unrecorded deed from Barbara Henshaw conveying the referenced
property.

(Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).

6. From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until approximately
June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water as needed on a daily
basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about how much water was
being used or how the water was being used. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
7. From the time the Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through June
20O0, the Kings never shut off the Henshaws' water. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755,
789-821).
8. Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the
-5-

Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water.
(Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
9. Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off the
Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws' from using
the water to irrigate their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
10. Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws, the
Kings placed a lA inch pipe and Vi inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The 3-inch
waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the Henshaws
by Mildred Watrous. King installed the lA inch pipe and the Vi inch gate valve for the
express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the water to operate
their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755,
789-821).
11. From the time the Kings installed the V2 inch pipe and gate valve on the 3inch waterline, installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws, the
Henshaws were denied access to the water they purchased from Mildred Watrous, who,
along with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from Jack and Bonnie
King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
12. On July 14, 2000, Barbara Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed
suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821).
13. King filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any water
-6-

rights and a counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he sold to the
Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. (Record 24-31).
14. In his answer, King also claimed that Mildred could only sell one half of the
water that the Kings sold to her and her Husband because the Water Deed given to the
Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that the water was sold to the Watrouses as joint
tenants rather than as tenants in common. (Record 24-31).
15. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a defendant
on August 22, 2003. (Record 467-481).
16. The Kings filed an answer to the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on
September 10, 2003. (Record 486-494).
17. On June 7, 2004, the Kings filed an amended answer and counterclaim
asserting the same defenses as Jack King did in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial
Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title." (Record 646-653).
18. Various motions were subsequently filed by both parties and the case went to
trial before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. (Record 988-994).
19. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April 19, 2006, the Kings moved for
a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw and Dana
Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case. (Record 1068-1072).
20. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the
case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with economic
relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion or theft. (Record 10681072).
-7-

21. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that, at most, Mr. Henshaw could
only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, because
the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it was a
conveyance as joint tenants, rather than tenants in common, and there was no evidence
that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his death. (Record
1088-1094, 1068-1072).
22. Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the
sole plaintiff. Mr. Henshaw was permitted to assert his claims that he had an easement to
connect the three-inch waterline to the Kings' six-inch waterline, to use the six-inch
waterline to water his property, and that the Kings sold water rights to the Watrouses,
which rights were later sold to Barbara Henshaw and then sold to Mr. Henshaw. (Record
1098-1094).
23. At conclusion of the trial, the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled
to use the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to Mr. Henshaw by
the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara
Henshaw to Dee Henshaw. (Record 1011-1012).
24. However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold water rights to the
Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty
Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to Dee
Henshaw and determined that the ICings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted
in themselves. (Record 1011-1012).
25. The Kings prepared "the Order" and sent a copy of "the Order" to Mr.
-8-

Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006. (Record 1068-1072).
26. Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to "the Order" on May 15, 2006. (Record
1075-1078).
27. However, that objection was not entered until May 18, 2006. (Record 10751078).
28. Nonetheless, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May
15,2006. (Record 1091-1099).
29. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to "the Order" on
or about May 18, 2006. (Record 1209-1214). That response was filed with the trial court
on May 22, 2006. (Record 1091-1099).
30. The trial court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection to
"the Order" on June 19, 2006. (Record 1125-1130).
31. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated that it had
signed and entered "the Order" on May 15, 2006.

(Record 1125-1130).

32. This was the first time either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the trial
court had signed and entered "the Order." (Record 1172).
33. Neither the Kings nor their counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a
"Notice of Judgment" on "the Order" as required by Rule 58a(d) URCP. (Record 11311138), see also, the Judgment Roll and Index.
34. Upon learning that the trial court had signed and entered "the Order" on May
15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming
that the trial court had improperly signed and entered "the Order," because the time for
-9-

him to file an objection to "the Order" had not expired at the time the trial court signed
and entered "the Order." This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006. (Record 1131-1138).
35. On September 13, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter
or Amend, based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not
binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rule 59, it could not extend
the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. (Record 1171-1174).
36. On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion For Relief Under Rule
60(b), asking the trial court to set aside that part of "the Order," ruling that Mildred
Watrous did not acquire title to the water the Kings sold her and her husband, Raymond,
at the time of Raymond's death and claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify
him that "the Order" had been entered and responded to his Objection to "the Order" for
the purpose of preventing him from learning that "the Order" had been entered in time to
file an appeal from "the Order". (Record 1175-1176).
37. On November 15, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b), stating that Mr. Henshaw
was not sufficiently diligent in determining if "the Order" had in fact been signed and
entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not binding on district courts.
(Record 1209-1214).
38. Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006. (Record
1215-1216).

-10-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the
Kings' motion for a directed verdict, claiming that only one-half of the water rights they
sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. The
trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error, and abused its discretion, when
it failed to set aside that portion of its directed verdict holding that only one-half of the
water rights they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond
Watrous' death.

vra
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT GRANTED THE KINGS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT,
CLAIMING THAT ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO
THE WATROUSES PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND
WATROUS'S DEATH. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED
TO SET ASIDE THAT PORTION OF ITS DIRECTED VERDICT HOLDING THAT
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES
PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT GRANTED THE KINGS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT
CLAIMING THAT ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO
THE WATROUSES PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND
WATROUS'S DEATH.
A. Marshaling Of Facts:
The trial court made no factual findings to support its ruling that Raymond
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses
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did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. In his Motion to Alter
or Amend, Mr. Henshaw specifically asked the trial court to enter factual findings so the
appeals courts could understand how the trial court determined that the Kings had
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights
the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond
Watrous' death. (Record 1154-1156). However, the trial court failed to do so.
Therefore, there are no facts for Mr. Henshaw to martial to support the trial court's ruling
that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. (Record
1171-1174).

B. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That Raymond Watrous'
Interest In, Or Ownership Of, The Water Rights The Kings Sold To The Watrouses Did
Not Pass To Mildred Watrous Upon Raymond Watrous' Death.
Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to assert that
Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights they sold to the
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Therefore,
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the Kings'
motion for a directed verdict ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of,
the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond Watrous' death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw.
In Sierra Club v. Dept. Of Environmental Quality, Div. Of Solid & Hazardous
Waste, 857 P.2d 982 (Utah, 1993) the Utah Supreme Court declared that: "The first and
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most widely used standard to show standing requires a plaintiff to show some distinct
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. " Citing
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis added). In Wright v.
Carver 886 P.2d 58; (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court, citing Shelledy v. Lore. 836
P.2d 786 (Utah 1992) again stated: "(third-party standing rule requires litigants to assert
their own legal rights and does not allow them to claim relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties). "
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) the U.S. Supreme
Court stated: [TJhe core component of standing requires, among other things, that "the
plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury infacf" and that the injury is "actual or imminent
not conjectural or hypothetical" (quotations and citation omitted)). This holding was
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. Jorgensen. 2006 UT App 168 2006 P.3d
(2006 UT App 168).
In Washington City. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan 82 P.3d 1125 (Utah
20O3) the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show
that he has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a
personal stake in the outcome" of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to
standing recognized in cases involving "importantpublic issues.
In Council of Holladav City v. Mayor Dennis Larkin. 89 P.3d 164 (Utah 2004) the
Utah Supreme Court declared: "Our law on standing requires that a [pjlaintiffmust be
able to show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. "
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In Havmond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), the
Utah Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in Utah. In
Bonneville, the Supreme Court stated:
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has
sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, the injury
and the cause of action being contemporaneous." 1A CJ.S. Actions § 32a
(1985); Jenkins v. Swan, ti/5 1\ l*i "45, 1148 (Utah 1983). In matters of
great public importance, we have employed other tests to evaluate whether
a plaintiff should be allowed to pursue a lawsuit where he has sustained no
injury. Standing may be found if the matter is of great public importance, if
the plaintiff, although lacking a distinct injury is in as good a position to
challenge the alleged illegality as any other potential plaintiff, and if the
issue is unlikely to ever be raised if the plaintiff is denied standing to sue.
Jenkins, 675 P. 2d at 1150.
None of the potential heirs, devisees or creditors of Raymond Watrous ever
claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water, and/or the water rights, did not pass
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Because none of the potential heirs,
devisees or creditors of Raymond Watrous ever claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest
in the water, and/or the water rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond
Watrous' death, the Kings are required to show that they have standing, on their own, to
assert that Mildred Watrous did not acquire all of Raymond Watrous' right, title and
interest in the water, and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses, at the time of
Raymond's death. And they must also show that they have standing, on their own, to
claim that she did not, or could not, convey all of the right, title and interest in the water,
and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses, by the Kings, to Barbara Henshaw and
ultimately to Dee Henshaw. The Kings did not do that, and they cannot do that.
The Kings have not claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water, and/or
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the water rights, passed to them, or should have passed to them, at the time of Raymond
Watrous5 death. The Kings have not claimed that they are heirs, devisees or creditors that
were entitled to make a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. Therefore, in
order for them to even assert that any right, title and interest in the water and/or the water
rights deeded to Raymond Watrous by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon
Raymond Watrous5 death, the Kings have to prove that they have independent standing to
make such an assertion or that they have standing to make such an assertion on the part of
an heir, devisee or creditor of the estate of Raymond Watrous. Furthermore, they had to
prove that they had standing to make such a claim at the time they asked the trial court for
a directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous5 interest in the water, and/or the water
rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of his death. They did not do so, and
they cannot do so.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous5 V2 interest in the water, did not
pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the
Kings have no standing, in this proceeding, to claim that Raymond Watrous5 Vi interest in
the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous5 death. Whether
Raymond's V2 interest in the water passed lA to Mildred and 1/8 to each of his two
children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two children or passed to them in some other
percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding.
Whatever happened to Mr. Watrous5 lA of the water, it did not pass to the Kings,
and the Kings have no standing to assert possible claims to the ownership of the water, or
water rights, on the part of Mr. Watrous5 children or any other person or entity in this
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proceeding. Likewise they have no standing to assert a claim that Raymond Watrous' V*
interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous on behalf of the public at large.
The Kings have not, and cannot, show any legal or equitable interest in
Raymond's lA interest in the water. The Kings have not, and cannot, show that they will
be harmed or prejudiced in any way whatsoever if Raymond's V2 interest in the water,
passed to Mildred Watrous rather than to some other person or entity. The Kings have
not, and cannot, show any significant public interest in the ownership of the water, that
would give them standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond's Vi interest in the water
in the interest of the public at large.
Because the Kings cannot "show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise
to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute, " Sierra Club, supra, or great public
interest that would give them standing to even assert a claim in this proceeding that
Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in the water, or water rights did not pass to Mildred
Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and indisputable Utah law, the Kings do not
have standing to litigate the issue of the disposition of Raymond Watrous' V2 ownership
of the water in this action.
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully assumed that the Kings had
standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in, or ownership of,
the water the Kings sold to the Watrouses in this proceeding, the trial court erred as a
matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict with respect to the
Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in the water, or water rights, did not pass
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death.
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Because the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for a
directed verdict with respect to the Kings' claim that Mr. Henshaw had to prove that all
right title and interest of Raymond Watrous' in the water and/or water rights, passed to
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, this Court must reverse the trial court's
ruling granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict and dismiss the Kings' claim that
Raymond's Watrous' interest in the water and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses
by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, as that
ruling by the trial court is plain error.

POINT n
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S RULE 60b
MOTION.
A, Marshaling Of Facts: The trial court made the following factual findings upon which
it relied in denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion:
1. The plaintiffs claim they did not receive proper notice of entry of the judgment
from the defendants as required by Rule 58A(d).
2. In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to
learn about entry of the judgment, therefore, the Court concludes that the
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment
had been entered.
3. Similarly, the only evidence the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they
were misled to believe that the judgment had been entered in this case is the
plaintiffs' statement that the defendants responded to their objections to the
proposed order instead of notifying them about entry of the order and judgment.
4. The case file shows that <(the Order" and the Judgment were signed and
entered by the Court on 15 May 2006.
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5. The plaintiffs signed their objections to the proposed order andjudgment on 15
May 2006, and they were received by the Court on 18, May 2006.
6. The defendants' Reply to the plaintiffs Objections was signed on 19 May 2006;
and stamped by the clerk 22 May 2006.
7. Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants
counsel knew about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and
mailed the Reply.
8. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel
for the defendants had actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed
to notify the plaintiffs about it.
9. Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to produce facts sufficient to
demonstrate that they were diligent in trying to learn about entry of the judgment
or that they were actually misled to believe that no judgment had been entered.
It is true that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel contacted the clerk of the trial
court to specifically determine if "the Order" had been signed and entered. However,
given the facts of this case and the procedural history, with respect to rulings on motions,
objections, and requests, etc., as more fully explained infra in this brief, it was not
unreasonable for either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel to conclude that "the Order5' would
not be signed and entered prior to the expiration of the time for Mr. Henshaw to object to
"the Order" or that the trial court would rule on Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order"
in less than a month's time. The trial court never ruled on any motion, objection or
request in less than a month, other than on this occasion. See the Judgment Roll and
Index for this matter.
The trial court is also technically correct is stating that the only direct evidence
"the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they were misled to believe that the
judgment had been entered in this case is the plaintiffs' statement that the defendants
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responded to their objections to the proposed order instead of notifying them about entry
of the order andjudgment

However, there is substantial indirect and circumstantial

evidence that the Kings knew that "the Order" had both been signed and entered. As set
forth, infra, in greater detail, the Kings have not denied that they knew "the Order" had
been signed and entered, and that they deliberately failed to notify Mr. Henshaw of that
fact as required by Rule 58A(d) URCP.

B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion And Committed Prejudicial And Reversible
Error When It Denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60b Motion.
Mr. Henshaw has a Constitutional right to appeal trial courts' directed verdict,
holding that Raymond Watrous' Vi interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the
Kings did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Art. VIII Sec.
5. Utah Constitution, provides that: "From all final judgments of the district courts, there
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court " C.G. Horman co. v. Lloyd: 28 Utah 2d
112, P.2d 124 (1972). Rule 4 URAP also provides Mr. Henshaw the right to appeal "the
Directed Verdict/5
The trial court denied Mr. Henshaw his right to appeal its directed verdict, holding
that Raymond Watrous' Vi interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the Kings did
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, when it denied Mr.
Henshaw's Rule 60b Motion asking the trial court to vacate its directed verdict to permit
him to appeal that portion of the directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' V2
interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the Kings did not pass to Mildred Watrous
upon Raymond Watrous' death.
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C. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60b
Motion Based On Its Legal Conclusion That Rule 1(f)(1) URCP Is Not Binding On Trial
Courts.
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP provides: "Objections to the proposed order shall be filed
within five days after service. " In pertinent part, Rule 6(a) URCP provides:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday,
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or
allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), is
less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be
excluded in the computation.
In pertinent part, Rule 6(e) URCP provides:
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is
required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after
the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served
upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as
calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be
included in the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that
if the, last day nfthe

3-day period

is a Saturday

a Sundays or a legal hnlida)?i thp

period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a
legal holiday.
The Kings filed "the Order" with the trial court on or about May 4, 2006, and also
allegedly mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006. (Record 1129). Because
the Kings mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006, the first day from which
to calculate Mr. Henshaw's time to object to "the Order" began on Friday, May 5, 2006.
Because May 6 was a Saturday and May 7 was Sunday, those days are not counted as
part of the five days Mr. Henshaw had to object to "the Order." Therefore, the second
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day of Mr. Henshaw's five days to respond to "the Order" was May 8, 2006, and the five
days expired on May 11, 2006.
Because the Kings mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw, under the provisions of
Rule 6(e), Mr. Henshaw had an additional three days to file any objections to the Kings5
proposed "the Order." Adding three days to the five days permitted under Rule 6 (a)
results in Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" becoming due on Sunday, May 14,
2006, and because the last day on which Mr. Henshaw could file his Objections to "the
Order" was a Sunday, under the provisions of Rule 6 (e), Mr. Henshaw had until the end
of the day on Monday, May 15, 2006 to file his Objections to "the Order."
Because Mr. Henshaw had until the end of the day on May 15, 2006 to file his
objections to "the Order," the Kings were not entitled to submit "the Order" to the trial
court, for signature and entry, until May 16, 2006, at the earliest. Rule 7(f)(2) URCP
further provides: The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being
served with an objection or the expiration of the time to object. (Emphasis added).
The Kings claim that they mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006.
Therefore, it is an undisputed that when the applicable URCP are applied to this case, the
trial court was not legally entitled to execute "the Order" until May 16, 2006 at the
earliest, and the Kings were not entitled to even submit "the Order" to the trial court for
signature until May 16, 2006 at the earliest. The trial court signed and entered "the
Order" on May 15, 2006, prior to the time for Mr. Henshaw to respond to "the Order"
had expired.
In Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc., v. Fifth District Court. 933 P.2d 1011, (Utah 1997),
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the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when the Fifth District Court entered an order
forfeiting a bond, before the time expired permitting execution on the bond, the order
permitting execution upon the bond must be set aside. The Court stated:
In both cases, however, bond was orderedforfeited before ninety days had elapsed
from the notice of entry of judgment upon the bail Section 77--20a-2(2) makes
clear that "[ejxecution on a judgment upon the bail may not issue in less than 90
days after the completion of the mailing or service of a notice of entry of judgment
upon the surety." Thus, the trial court prematurely ordered the bonds forfeited
before the statutory time for execution on the bond. The order of execution is
therefore set aside.
The reasoning and holding of Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc., is directly relevant and applicable
to this case. Because it is undisputed that the trial court entered "the Order" before the
time permitted for Mr. Henshaw to object to "the Order" had expired, under the holding
and reasoning of Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc., "the Order," that was prematurely entered,
must be vacated.
The trial court cited to Tolboe Construction Co., v. Staker Paving and
Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984) in its denial of Mr. Henshaw5 s Rule 60b
Motion, claiming that courts are not bound by the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP.
However, the version of Rule 2.9 FRCP reviewed in Tolboe, and in effect in 1982, is
substantially different from the present 7(f)(2) URCP applicable in this case. As the
Tolboe court stated:
The rule requires first that a copy of the documents be served upon opposing
counsel before the said documents are presented to the court for signature....
The rule's only other requirement is that the notice of objection to the said
documents be submitted to both the court and counsel within five days after
service. (Emphasis added).
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP also provides: 'The party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an objection or the expiration of the time to
object. " (Emphasis added). Therefore, it is indisputable that the Kings were not even
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entitled to submit "the Order" to the trial court for signature until the time for Mr.
Henshaw to object to "the Order" had expired. Furthermore, in Tolboe the court
considered and ruled on the objections before the time to appeal had expired. In this case
the trial court ruled on Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" after the time to appeal
"the Order" had expired. Additionally, the holding of Tolboe was tacitly overruled in
Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc., supra.
In Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of
Appeals stated:
[TJhe demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure
and demand a procedure appropriate to the case andjust to the parties involved."
Ruppv: Grantsville City, 610P.2d338, 341 (Utah 1980). One of the fundamental
requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard. Worrall v. Ogden
City Fire Dept, 616P.2d598, 601 (Utah 1980).
Clearly in this case the entry of "the Order" prior to the expiration of the time for Mr.
Henshaw to object to "the Order" constitutes a denial of Mr. Henshaw's "opportunity to
be fully heard'' as mandated in Wiscombe. Thus the premature signing and entry of "the
Order" denied Mr. Henshaw his 'fundamental" due process right to the uopportunity to
be fully heard" on his objections to "the Order" and appeal "the Order" as mandated in
Wiscombe.
The premature execution and filing of "the Order" on May 15, 2006, was invalid
and denied Mr. Henshaw his due process and equal protection rights. Therefore, this
Court must enter an order vacating "the Order".

P . The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60B
Motion Based On Conclusion That Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent Enough In
Determining Whether Or Not "the Order" Had Been Entered.
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It is undisputed that the Kings had a legal obligation under the express provisions
of Rule 58(A)(d) to inform Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" had been signed and entered.
Mr. Henshaw did not fail to "keep himself informed of the court proceedings, " as the
Kings falsely claim and the trial court concluded. Rather, the Kings engaged in a scheme
designed to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that "the Order" and been signed and
entered.
Rule 58A(d) URCP provides:
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment A copy of the signedjudgment shall be
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The
time for fling a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this
provision.
However, rather than informing Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" had been signed and
entered, the Kings responded to Mr. Henshaw's Objections to "the Order." The Kings
did so to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that the Directed Verdict had been signed
and entered.
1, The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial and Reversible Error In Concluding
That Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent In Determining If the Order On Directed
Verdicts Had Been Entered.
In denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion the trial court made the following
factual finding:
3. In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to
learn about entry of the judgment, Therefore, the Court concludes that the
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment
had been entered.
It is true that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel specifically contacted the trial court to
determine if "the Order" had been entered. However, given the facts of this case, there
was no reason for either Mr. Henshaw or his attorney to assume that the trial court had
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signed and entered "the Order" or to even assume that the Kings had improperly
submitted "the Order55 to the trial court for signature and entry prior to May 16, 2006, in
violation of Rule 7(2) URCP.
In more than twenty years of practice Mr. Henshaw's counsel has never been
involved in a case in which an order was submitted to a court for signature without some
type of notice being given to the opposing counsel. Likewise, in more than twenty years
of practice Mr. Henshaw's counsel has never been involved in a case in which a request
to sign and enter a proposed order was not submitted to the opposing party at the time the
proposed order was submitted to the trial court. Therefore, there was no reason why
either Mr. Henshaw or his attorney would assume that the Kings had improperly and
prematurely submitted "the Order5' to the trial court for signature and entry, in violation
of the Rule 7(2) URCP, or that the trial court would improperly and prematurely sign and
enter "the Order" in violation Rule 7(2) URCP.
The trial court's finding that: "the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating
any efforts to learn about entry of the judgment, Therefore, the Court concludes that the
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment had been
entered, " is tantamount to a ruling that parties to litigation must assume that opposing
parties and their counsel will not comply with the URCP and that trial courts also will not
comply with or enforce the URCP. Therefore, according to the trial court's ruling,
attorneys must constantly monitor their cases to insure that the URCP are being properly
applied and followed.
Surely the practice of law in Utah has not disintegrated to the extent that parties to
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litigation must assume that the URCP will regularly and routinely be ignored and that
they must constantly check court files to assure that they are aware of every violation of
the URCP. The trial court's finding that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel were
"diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered" is plain
error and an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
2. The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial and Reversible Error. And Abused Its
Discretion, In Concluding That The Only Evidence Mr. Henshaw Advance In An
Attempt To Prove He Was Misled To Believe That The Judgment Had Been
Entered In This Case Is Mr. Henshaw's Statement That The Kings Responded To
His Objections To "The Order" Instead Of Notifying Him About Entry Of The
Order And Judgment
In denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion the trial court also made these
additional findings:
7. Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants
counsel knew about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and
mailed the Reply
8. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel
for the defendants had actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed
to notify the plaintiffs about it
Those determinations are incorrect and constitute prejudicial and reversible error and an
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP provides: The party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an objection or the expiration of the time to
object (Emphasis added). It does not contain any provision authorizing a response to
objections to a proposed order. The only reason the Kings filed a response to Mr.
Henshaw's objection to "the Order" was to prevent Mr. Henshaw and his attorney from
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learning that "the Order" had been signed and entered.
The Kings have not disputed that they knew "the Order" had been signed and
entered. (Record 1191-1200). If the Kings truly did not know that "the Order" had been
signed and entered, they would have so stated in response to Mr. Henshaw's assertion,
contained in his Memorandum in Support of his Rule 60(b) Motion, that the Kings knew
"the Order" had been signed and entered and failed to inform Mr. Henshaw of that fact
for the express purpose of preventing him from appealing "the Order." If the Kings truly
did not know that "the Order" had been entered, they would have stated that they would
have not responded to Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" if they knew that "the
Order" had been entered. They did not do so. Again showing that they in fact knew "the
Order" had been signed and entered.
Any attorney or party accused of deliberately engaging in a scheme to prevent an
opposing party from learning that an order had been entered would have denied that
assertion and claimed that they did not know the order had been entered in a responding
memorandum, if in fact they did not know that the order had been entered. The fact
neither the Kings nor their counsel made such a claim, makes it clear that they in fact
knew the order had both been signed and entered.
Because the indisputable facts of this case clearly and unequivocally establish that
the Kings both knew "the Order" had been signed and entered and that they deliberately
engaged in a scheme to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that "the Order" had been
signed and entered, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error and abused
its discretion when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion.
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3, Given The Procedurally History Of This Case, The Trial Court Committed
Prejudicial And Reversible Error And Abused Its Discretion In Determining That
Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent Enough In Determining Whether Or Not The
Order On The Kings' Motion For A Directed Verdict Had Been Entered.
Given the history of the time delays in receiving decisions on motions, objections
and requests in this case, it was completely reasonable for Mr. Henshaw and his counsel
to not expect a decision on his Objection to the Kings' proposed "the Order" for more
than a month after it had been filed. The following is a partial history of the motions,
requests and objections filed by the parties and the time it took to get a ruling on the
various filings:
1) The Henshaws filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 03/07/2002.
The trial court did not address the Henshaws' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment until
05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
2) The Henshaws filed a Motion to Strike the Sure-Reply of the Kings on
04/06/2002 and a Motion to Compel that same day. Again the trial court did not address
those Motions until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
3) The Henshaws filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 06/19/2002. That
Motion was not ruled on until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
4) The Kings filed a motion to compel on 11/02/2002. That motion was not ruled
upon until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
5) The Henshaws filed a Motion to Reconsider on 05/08/2003. That motion was
not ruled upon until 07/28/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
6) The Henshaws filed a request for a Clarification of Decision on 05/27/03.
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That Request was not ruled upon until 08/05/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
7) The Kings filed a motion to quash service on Bonnie King on 03/03 2004.
That motion was not ruled upon until 04/28/2004. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
8) The Henshaws filed a Dismissal of claims on 05/08/2004. The Kings filed an
objection to the Henshaws9 Dismissal of claims on 06/10/2004. That motion was not
ruled upon until 08/03/2004. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
9) The Kings filed a motion to exclude witnesses and evidence on 12/27/2005.
That motion was not ruled upon until 03/23/2006. See the Judgment Roll and Index.
If all decisions in this case had been entered, immediately upon the expiration of
the time to respond to such motions, objections or requests, then perhaps it could be said
that Mr. Henshaw and his counsel were not diligent enough in attempting to determine if
"the Order" had been entered. However, given the fact that the time to receive a decision
on motions, objections and/or requests took from fourteen months on the Henshaws'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and almost always two to three months or more on
other motions, objections and requests, it was not reasonable of logical for the trial court
to determine that Mr. Henshaw and his counsel were not diligent enough in determining
if "the Order" had been entered because neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel specifically
inquired of the clerk of the trial court to see if perchance "the Order" had been entered
sooner than a month after Mr. Henshaw filed his Objection to "the Order," especially
when the neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel had any knowledge that "the Order" had
been prematurely submitted to the trial court for signing and entry, in violation of Rule
7(f)(2) URCP.
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it granted
the Kings' motion for a directed verdict. Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings
had no standing to ask the trial court to rule that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in
the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death. Therefore, this Court must
reverse that part of "the Order" holding that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death.
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error and abused its discretion
when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. The trial court prematurely and
unlawfully entered "the Order" holding that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death. The effect of the premature and
unlawful entry is that Mr. Henshaw was denied his Constitutional right appeal the trial
court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the water rights did not pass to
Mildred upon his death. The trial court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest
in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death is plain error and, therefore
must be reversed.
The Kings deliberately engaged in a scheme to deny Mr. Henshaw his
Constitutional and due process rights to appeal "the Order" because they knew that on
appeal "the Order" would be reversed. The Kings should not be permitted to deny Mr.
Henshaw his Constitutional and due process rights to appeal "the Order."
The trial court improperly concluded that Mr. Henshaw was not diligent enough in
attempting to learn if "the Order" had been entered. However, given the facts of this
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case, including the Kings failure to notify Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" and been signed
and entered or even that it had been submitted to the trial court for signature and entry,
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion,
especially given the history of delays in obtaining rulings on motions, objections and
requests in this case.
Rule 1(a) URCP provides that the URCP "shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. " Given the indisputable
facts of this case, the interest of justice, fairness and equity demand that Mr. Henshaw be
afforded the opportunity to appeal that portion of "the Order" ruling that Raymond
Watrous5 one-half interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death, in
order to insure that Mr. Henshaw5 s Constitutional and due process rights are protected
and preserved and that he is guaranteed the same rights as other litigants.
Wherefore, Mr. Henshaw respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's denial of Mr. Henshaw5s Rule 60(b) Motion and reverse that portion of "the
Order,55 holding that Raymond Watrous5 one-half interest in the water rights did not pass
to Mildred upon his death, in as much as that holding is plain error under clear and
controlling Utah law. Mr. Henshaw also requests that he be awarded his appeal costs and
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal based on the fact that he was the
prevailing party in the Kings quiet title claim.
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Respectfully submitted this

/r day of April 2007.
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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I hereby certify that on the

ay of April 2007,1 hand delivered two true

and correct copes of the foregoing Brief to the person(s) at the address(es) below:
David R. Williams
WOODBURY AND KESLER
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358

iS^^Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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APPENDIX
Rule4URAP:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealedfrom. However, when a judgment or order is entered
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry
of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after
entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective
to appeal only from the underlyingjudgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of
any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice
of appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or
order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this rule, whichever period last expires.
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(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the
trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall
reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such
reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting
entity. If the defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel.
The prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to file a written response. If
the prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties
may present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an
order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order.
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely
filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for
filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice
of appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period
provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal
Rule 1(a) URCP.
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or
in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81.
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
Rule 6(a) URCP:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules,
by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run
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shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it
is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end
of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of
time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under
subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays
shall be excluded in the computation.
Rule 6(e) URCP:
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3
days shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under subsection
(a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3day period under this subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP:
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed
within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
Rule 58A(d) URCP:
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signedjudgment shall be
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision.
Rule 59 URCP:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question
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submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after
the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion
for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing
party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time
within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extendedfor an
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Rule 60(b) URCP:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
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within a reasonable time andfor reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken, A motion under this Subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
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